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On Bergson’s Reformation of Philosophy 
Keith Ansell-Pearson 
University of Warwick 
In Creative Evolution, Henri Bergson is a diligent reader of the biological 
literature of his day and intended to make a contribution to the science of 
biology and to the philosophy of life.1 The primary aim of the text though is 
to show the need for a fundamental reformation of philosophy. Bergson 
wants to show the limits of mechanism, and how, through an appreciation 
of the evolution of life, philosophy can expand our perception of the 
universe. Aspects of Bergson’s attempt to expand human perception in the 
text may not be to the taste of many contemporary readers, keen, as they no 
doubt are, to shy away from any romance of evolution. On this point it 
might be claimed that Bergson is remaining faithful to philosophy’s vocation 
as the product of wonder: “The effort after the general characterization of 
the world around us is the romance of human thought.”2 However, even if 
today we feel no affinity with this aspect of Bergson’s thinking about 
evolution, I want to show that we can still gain a great deal of instruction 
from his attempt to get us closer to the realities of life and to creative 
evolution.  
 
On the Ambition of Creative Evolution 
In the English-speaking world Creative Evolution appears to have the status 
of an optional text in Bergson's oeuvre.3 This is in marked contrast to the 
French reception where thinkers from Georges Canguilhem to Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty and Gilles Deleuze undertook close readings of the text. 
Deleuze's philosophy of difference is developed in significant part from out 
of a reading of Creative Evolution. So long as we lack an encounter with this 
text we remain ignorant of crucial aspects of Bergson's attempt to reform 
and transform philosophical thinking and practice. Bergson’s ambition with 
this text is clearly stated towards the end of Chapter Two. It is worth citing 
what he says almost in full so as to appreciate the full breadth of the 
endeavour he is pursuing with his inquiry and to have an initial grasp of 
why he is so interested in evolution: 
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We shall see that the problem of knowledge […] is one with the 
metaphysical problem, and that both one and the other depend on 
experience. On the one hand, indeed, if intelligence is charged with 
matter and instinct with life, we must squeeze them both in order 
to get the double essence from them; metaphysics is therefore 
dependent upon the theory of knowledge. But, on the other hand, if 
consciousness has thus split up into intuition and intelligence, it is 
because of the need it had to apply itself to matter at the same time 
as it had to follow the stream of life. The double form of 
consciousness is then due to the double form of the real, and the 
theory of knowledge must be dependent upon metaphysics. In fact, 
each of these two lines of thought leads to the other; they form a 
circle, and there can be no other centre to the circle but the 
empirical study of evolution. It is only in seeing consciousness run 
through matter, lose itself there and find itself there again, divide 
and reconstitute itself, that we shall form an idea of the mutual 
opposition of the two terms, as also, perhaps of their common 
origin. But, on the other hand, by dwelling on this opposition of the 
two elements and on this identity of origin, perhaps we shall bring 
out more clearly the meaning of evolution itself.4  
Here we clearly see in evidence the complexity of Bergson’s philosophical 
position: it concerns itself with epistemology and metaphysics, in which 
metaphysics is said to be dependent on epistemology and then epistemology 
is said to be ultimately dependent on metaphysics. For Bergson there are 
two principal ways by which we can know something: first, by going 
around it, and, second, by “entering into it,” and the latter is the province of 
metaphysics as he conceives it.5 Bergson wants to attend to both matter and 
life, and to both intuition and intelligence, and thinks he can illuminate all of 
this through “the empirical study of evolution.”6  
Although the ambition of the inquiry is clearly stated in the passage I 
have just cited, in his actual introduction to the text Bergson also 
acknowledges that a philosophy of the kind he is seeking will not be made 
in a day. Rather, and unlike philosophical systems that are the work of an 
individual genius, such a philosophy can be developed only through the 
collective and progressive effort of a number of thinkers and observers that 
complete and correct each other. In his appraisal of the work of the 
physiologist Claude Bernard, Bergson cites approvingly Bernard’s mistrust 
of philosophical and scientific systems: “Systems tend to enslave the human 
mind.”7 The attempt to embrace the totality of things in simple formulas 
needs to be abandoned. This is not without consequence for a philosophy of 
nature since it means relinquishing the idea that nature is one and that 
nature can be neatly captured by our ideas of it. On the contrary, we need to 
be challenged by our observations of nature. Bergson imagines the new 
philosopher working in concert with the scientist, saying to himself that, 
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“Nature is what it is, and as our intelligence, which is part of it, is less vast 
than nature, it is doubtful whether any of our present ideas is large enough 
to embrace it.”8  
Bergson states the importance of biology for philosophical reflection in 
a number of essays. In an essay of 1922, for example, he argues that, “In the 
labyrinth of acts, states and faculties of mind, the thread which one must 
never lose is the one furnished by biology. Primum vivere” [first there is life].9 
In an essay of 1904 on Felix Ravaisson, entitled “The Life and Work of 
Ravaisson,” he speaks of the mind having a natural proclivity to always turn 
in the direction of materialism and to imagine it can persist in such a 
direction: “It seeks quite naturally a mechanical or geometrical explanation 
of what it sees.”10 Such an attitude Bergson regards as a survival of 
preceding centuries, one that harks back to an epoch when science was 
conceived largely as geometry. The significance of the science of the 
nineteenth century is that it places at the centre of its inquiry the study of 
living beings. He concedes that even here science may still be governed by 
mechanics but, as he makes clear a few years later in Creative Evolution, what 
we are dealing with here is a mechanics of transformation, which is a 
mechanics that cannot be developed by relying upon geometrical schemas of 
thought. Change, transformation, and evolution are bound up with living 
and open systems. With this critical reference to “materialism” it seems clear 
that Bergson invariably treats it as an essentially mechanistic modelling of 
reality that deals with systems into which time does not bite. The focus is on 
aspects of repetition in which the intellect selects in a given situation 
whatever is like something it already knows so as to fit it into a pre-existing 
mould or schema; in this way it applies the principle that “like produces 
like.” It naturally rebels against the idea of an originality and 
unforeseeability of forms. Similarly, classical science focuses its attention on 
isolable or closed systems simply because anything that is irreducible and 
irreversible in the successive moments of a history eludes it. In cases of 
organic evolution Bergson insists that foreseeing the form in advance is not 
possible. This is not because there are no conditions or specific causes of 
evolution, but rather owing to the fact that they are built into the particular 
form of organic life and peculiar to that phase of its history in which life 
finds itself at the moment of producing the form.  
Creative Evolution is a text that engages with the history of philosophy 
and the history of science and in terms of their ancient and modern aspects. 
The two key philosophical figures engaged with in the text are Aristotle and 
Kant, though there are also important engagements with the likes of Spinoza 
and Fichte. Indeed, on one level it is possible to read Creative Evolution as an 
attempt to refute Spinoza and dispel the entrancing effect his logical 
conception of reality has over modern minds. For a system like Spinoza’s, 
Bergson notes, true or genuine being is endowed with a logical existence 
more than a psychological or even physical one: “For the nature of a purely 
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logical existence is such that it seems to be self-sufficient and to posit itself 
by the effect alone of the force immanent in truth.”11 Spinozism is an attempt 
to make the mystery of existence, such as why minds and bodies exist, 
vanish and instead of making actual observations of nature the philosopher 
advances a logical system in which at the base of everything that exists is a 
self-positing being dwelling in eternity. In contrast to this logical system 
Bergson intends to develop a conception of efficient causality that includes 
within it duration and free choice.  
 
The Challenge of the New Biology 
What challenge did Bergson think the new biology presented? First, and 
most obviously, there is the rejection of Aristotle's thinking. In his discussion 
of the development of animal life in Chapter Two of Creative Evolution he 
says that the cardinal error that has vitiated almost all philosophies of nature 
from Aristotle onwards lies in seeing in vegetative, instinctive, and rational 
life, successive degrees in the development of one and the same tendency. In 
fact, they are “divergent directions of an activity that has split up as it 
grew.”12 This is in accord with one crucial aspect of his conception of life, 
namely that it does not proceed by the association and addition of elements 
but by dissociation and division. Bergson argues that one of the clearest 
results of modern biology is to have shown that evolution has taken place 
along divergent lines. This means that it is no longer possible to uphold the 
biology of Aristotle in which the series of living beings is regarded as 
unilinear. Aristotle belongs to the science of the ancients that rests, he says, 
on a “clumsy interpretation of the physical in terms of the vital.”13 All of this 
is of no small concern to Bergson given that in his essay on Ravaisson he 
clearly sympathizes with the latter’s preference for Aristotle over Plato. 
Indeed, he even describes Aristotle as the founder of metaphysics and the 
initiator of “a certain method of thinking which is philosophy itself.”14 
Second, there is the significance of the modern doctrine of 
transformism, a doctrine that Bergson says he accepts “as a sufficiently exact 
and precise expression of the facts actually known.”15 The language of 
transformism, he writes, “forces itself now upon all philosophy, as the 
dogmatic affirmation of transformism forces itself upon science.”16 On the 
one hand it shows us that the highest forms of life—highest in terms of 
complexity—emerge from a very elementary form of life, thus the most 
complex has been able to issue from the most simple by way of evolution. 
On the other hand it shows that life can no longer be treated as an 
abstraction. Life can now be described in terms of the continuity of genetic 
energy that cuts across the bodies “it has organized one after another, 
passing from generation to generation, [and that] has become divided 
among species and distributed amongst individuals without losing anything 
of its force, rather intensifying in proportion to its advance.”17  
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One of the most important aspects of Bergson’s approach to evolution 
in the book, and elsewhere, is his insistence that we should resist the 
temptation to shrink nature to the measure of our ideas. He makes this clear, 
for example, at the end of his essay on Claude Bernard. In Creative Evolution 
he insists that we need to display a readiness to be taken by surprise in the 
study of nature and learn to appreciate that there might be a difference 
between human logic and the logic of nature: “What is absurd in our eyes is 
not necessarily so in the eyes of nature.”18 We cannot approach nature with 
any a priori conceptions of parts and wholes or any a priori conception of 
what constitutes life, including how we delimit the boundaries of an 
organism and hence define it. We must resist the temptation to place or hold 
nature within our own ideas or shrink reality to the measure of them. We 
should not allow our need for a unity of knowledge to impose itself upon 
the multiplicity of nature. To follow the sinuosities of reality means that we 
cannot slot the real into a concept of all concepts, be it Spirit, Substance, Ego, 
or Will. Bergson notes that all thought becomes lodged into concepts that 
congeal and harden and we have to be aware of the dangers presented by 
this. He regarded Schopenhauer's “will to life,” which we might think of as a 
precursor of the élan vital, as an empty concept supported by a barren theory 
of metaphysics. It is in Creative Evolution that Bergson proposes the need for 
thought to undergo a fundamental reform and education: “It is not enough 
to determine, by careful analysis, the categories of thought; we must 
engender them.”19 This statement comes in the wake of an engagement with 
Kant, one of several that feature in the book. Bergson asks, “Created by life, 
in definite circumstances, to act on definite things, how can it [the logical 
form of thought] embrace life, of which it is only an aspect?”20 Life 
challenges the essential categories of thought: unity, multiplicity, mechanical 
causality, and intelligent finality all fall short. A consideration of life in its 
evolutionary aspects makes it virtually impossible to say where 
individuality begins and ends, whether the living being is one or many, 
whether it is the cells that associate themselves into an organism or the 
organism that dissociates itself into cells. “It would be difficult to cite a 
biological discovery due to pure reasoning.” All the moulds in which we 
seek to force the living crack: “They are too narrow…too rigid, for what we 
try to put into them.”21 Unity and multiplicity, or the one and the many, are 
categories of inert matter; the vital impetus can be conceived neither as pure 
unity nor pure multiplicity. If we take as an example the most rudimentary 
organisms that consist of only a single cell we find already “that the 
apparent individuality of the whole is the composition of an undefined 
number of potential (virtuelles) individualities potentially (virtuellement) 
associated.”22  
Bergson conceives metaphysics as a mode of knowledge that can 
advance by the gradual accumulation of obtained results. In other words, 
metaphysics does not have to be a take-it-or-leave-it system that is forever in 
dispute, thinking abstractly and vainly without the support of empirical 
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science. Not only is it the case for Bergson that metaphysics can be a true 
empiricism, but it can also work with science in an intellectual effort to 
advance our knowledge of the various sources, tendencies, and directions of 
life. In his Huxley lecture of 1911 on “Life and Consciousness” he writes: 
“we possess now a certain number of lines of facts, which do not go as far as 
we want, but which we can prolong hypothetically.”23 This is taken up again 
in the Two Sources of Morality and Religion, where he states that the different 
lines of fact indicate for us the direction of truth but none go far enough; the 
attainment of truth can only take place when the lines are prolonged to the 
point where they intersect.24 He insists that the knowledge we wish to 
develop and advance concerning evolution must “keep to ascertained facts 
and the probabilities suggested by them.”25 Bergson’s originality consists in 
placing life at the centre of the study of nature. It is perhaps Whitehead who 
best articulates the task here when he writes that the modern problem of 
philosophy and of science is, “the status of life.”26 For Bergson, however, life 
can no longer be thought about independently of the empirical study of 
evolution.  
 
Bergson on Philosophy and the Study of Evolution 
Bergson is making two essential claims in his opening introduction to the 
text, and they are interrelated: first, that we have to see the theory of 
knowledge and the theory of life as deeply related; second, that there is a 
need to “think beyond the human condition” or human state. Indeed, 
Bergson conceives philosophy as the discipline that “raises us above the 
human condition” (la philosophie nous aura élevés au-dessus de la condition 
humaine’) and makes the effort to “surpass” (dépasser) it.27 This reveals itself 
to be something of an extraordinary endeavour since it means bringing the 
human intellect into rapport with other kinds of consciousness. Bergson 
does not specify what exactly he means by this in his introduction.  
How are these two points related? Bergson claims that the theory of 
knowledge and theory of life are to be regarded as inseparable. If we do not 
place our thinking about the nature, character, and limits of knowledge 
within the context of the evolution of life then we risk uncritically accepting 
the concepts that have been placed at our disposal. It means we think within 
pre-existing frames. We need, then, to ask two questions: first, how has the 
human intellect evolved (since it does not simply think for the sake of it but 
has evolved as an organ of action and utility)?, and second, how can we 
enlarge and go beyond the frames of knowledge available to us? 
Bergson has a specific conception of the human intellect and of matter. 
The intellect has moulded itself on the geometrical tendency of matter and 
so as to better further its instrumental manipulations of matter. His chief 
claim is that the intellect has to be viewed within the context of the evolution 
of human life and that when we do this we can better grasp its limits and 
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how to think beyond it. The task, in short, is to attempt to think beyond the 
representational and spatial habits of the intellect. For Bergson perhaps the 
chief function of philosophy is to expand our perception of the world and 
the universe. Although Whitehead contests Bergson’s view that the intellect 
has an inherent tendency to spatialize, he does think that “the history of 
philosophy supports Bergson’s charge that the human intellect ‘spatializes 
the universe,’” ignoring the fluency of life and analyzing the world in terms 
of static categories and a static materialism.28  
Bergson’s criticism in Creative Evolution is chiefly directed at what he 
calls “evolutionist philosophy,” by which he specifically means the work of 
Herbert Spencer. The problem with this philosophy is that it uncritically 
extends to the phenomena of life the same methods of explanation that have 
yielded successful results in the case of the study of unorganized matter. 
Bergson accuses this evolutionism, which in Kantian fashion claims only to 
come up with a symbolical image of the real in which the essence of things 
will always escape us, of an excess of humility. He says this because he 
thinks that it is possible for us to go beyond the human state and enlarge our 
perception so as to provide us with an insight into the depths of life. He also 
insists that this is not easy to do.  
Here we see the character of Bergson’s interest in evolution. It forms 
an essential part of his very conception of what philosophy is: an attempt at 
an enlarged perception where we think “beyond the human condition.” The 
problem with the mechanistic and geometrical understanding is that “it 
makes the total activity of life shrink to the form of a certain human activity 
which is only a partial and local manifestation of life.”29 In the text itself 
Bergson will argue that matter itself is to be characterized by certain 
tendencies, such as spatiality, so when the human intellect thinks in these 
terms it is representing an aspect of the real. Bergson’s point is that this is 
only one aspect.  
How, though, is it possible to think beyond the human condition and 
outside of its particular framing of reality? This is where Bergson appeals to 
evolution itself and stresses that the line of evolution that has culminated in 
the human is not the only line. His idea seems to be a radical one, namely, 
that there are other forms of life-consciousness that express something that 
is immanent and essential in the evolutionary movement, and the critical 
task is to then bring these other forms into contact or communication with 
the human intellect. Bergson poses the question: would not the result be a 
consciousness as wide as life? What does he have in mind? The reader has to 
wait until the later chapters in the book before being fully able to 
comprehend him. Bergson is suggesting that it is possible to cultivate, 
through intellectual effort, a perception of life where we experience 
something of the very impetus of creative life itself or what he describes as 
the push of life and that has led to the creation of divergent forms of life 
from a common impulsion, such as plant and animal. In short, philosophy is 
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that discipline of thinking that tries to make the effort to establish contact 
with the vitality and creativity of life and involving novelty, invention, 
process, and duration. As I have noted, he does not pretend that it is easy to 
do this; on the contrary, he stresses that it is necessary to perform a certain 
violence on ourselves so as to break with our evolved habits of 
representation and established patterns of thought. In the introduction to 
Creative Evolution he tackles the objection that may be raised against the 
project he is inviting us to pursue: will it not be through our intellect and our 
intellect alone that we perceive the other forms of consciousness? In answer 
to this objection he points out that this would be the case if we were pure 
intellects, but the fact is, he thinks, we are not. Around our conceptual and 
logical modes of thought, and that have moulded themselves on certain 
aspects and tendencies of the real, there remains a vague nebulosity that is 
made of the same substance out of which the luminous nucleus we call the 
intellect has been fashioned. Here we shall find, he thinks and hopes, certain 
powers—powers of insight, vision, and perception—the nature of which we 
have only an indistinct feeling when we remain shut up in ourselves and 
exist as closed beings. The task of philosophy is to make these powers clear 
and distinct, Bergson says in a clear reference to Descartes.  
 
Life  
Bergson holds to the view that life is something sui generis and he clearly 
thinks a distinction needs to be drawn between “matter” and “life” since 
they are two different tendencies. This also helps us to understand why he is 
keen to maintain a separation between physics and chemistry on the one 
hand and biology on the other, and explains the attraction biology has for 
him. Basically, for Bergson physics and chemistry proceed as if historical 
time did not count and in which aspects of the present are calculable as 
functions of the past. This is not the case, he thinks, with biology. He writes: 
Nothing of this sort in the domain of life. Here calculation touches, 
at most, certain phenomena of organic destruction. Organic creation, 
on the contrary, the evolutionary phenomena which properly 
constitute life, we cannot in any way subject to a mathematical 
treatment. It will be said that this impotence is due only to our 
ignorance. But it may well equally express the fact that the present 
moment of a living body does not find its explanation in the 
moment immediately before, that all the past of the organism must 
be added to that moment, its heredity—in fact, the whole of a very 
long history.30  
Bergson is associating life with the phenomena of organic creation such as 
growth, maturation, ageing, and so on. A living body is characterized by 
continuity of change, the preservation of the past in the present, and by real 
duration. But he does not have a single conception of life. However, he does 
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appear to think that to explain evolution we need a special principle of life 
and that it is something distinct from the properties of matter. What exactly 
is this?  
From the beginnings of his teaching career—see, for example, the 
lectures on the “Metaphysics of Life” from 1887-8 and delivered at 
Clermont-Ferrand—Bergson was keen to reflect on the origin and nature of 
life and to contest what he took to be the dogmas of materialism. He notes 
that a living body differs from brute matter by the fact that it displays a kind 
of initiative and that when we examine life, even in its rudimentary state, we 
observe new characteristics that cannot be mathematically foreseen: “Two 
seeds placed in the same ground and that present the same aspect to 
scientific observation will not behave in the same way.”31 For Bergson, then, 
what should impress itself upon us in the study of life is the capacity living 
bodies display for responding to problems in their environment in a manner 
that is not pre-given or predictable. The initiative they display is, “opposed 
to the fatal and disorganizing action of physical and chemical laws,” and he 
cites Xavier Bichat’s well-known definition of life as “the assemblage of the 
forces that resist death”32 (he will return to this “fatalistic” aspect of the 
world if left to itself in his 1911 lecture on “Life and Consciousness”).33 
Bergson also wishes to draw attention to the complexity of a living 
organism, in which, when we observe its growth and development, we can 
observe a “marvellous coordination of elements that together seem to tend 
toward a single goal,” including the diverse functions of digestion, 
circulation, and respiration.34  
Bergson provides a potted history of materialism, referring to 
Lucretius and Epicurus, and Cartesians and Spinozists (who are not, he 
notes, straightforward materialists since their systems display idealist 
tendencies), and notes that it is in the nineteenth century that the 
mechanistic theory of life claims to be based on scientific facts and evidence, 
and he refers in particular to Buchner, Moleschott, and especially Haeckel 
(in a lecture of 1912 Bergson will also note the contribution made by the likes 
of La Mettrie, Helvetius Bonnet, Cabanis, and so on).35 Bergson’s main 
quarrel with materialism is that it deprives life of its specific characteristics 
and construes life in terms of a universal mechanism. He holds materialism 
to be an arbitrary hypothesis with questionable scientific evidence to 
support its claims. He never challenges the idea that a living body, such as 
the human body, is made up of the same physical and chemical forces as the 
rest of nature or the claim that it is made up of elements of brute matter. He 
does not wish to agree with Bichat that life is in a struggle with the forces of 
inorganic nature since his main point is that these forces do not behave in 
the same way in the presence of brute matter and living matter: “Up to a 
certain point, the effect is indeterminate.”36  
In his early lectures, then, we see Bergson taking materialists to task 
for the attempt, as he sees it, of suppressing from matter all initiative and 
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spontaneity and imagining at work in nature a universal mechanism. These 
are his principal claims against materialism and they do not appear to 
change in the evolution of his writings. Life in Creative Evolution appears to 
work in an essentially twofold manner: as a vital impetus that can explain 
the movement of creative evolution, and as duration and that can account 
for the complexity of living systems. In Creative Evolution, then, Bergson 
speaks of a creative energy at work in evolution, and of a common 
impulsion as the source of life. He also speaks of an “intention” and an 
“effort” in conceiving life, and sometimes of a “power” and a “striving,” as 
in his Huxley lecture of 1911 on “Life and Consciousness.” Bergson is 
interested in developments in biology, especially the neo-Darwinism of 
August Weissman and his theory of the germ plasm, because he thinks this 
has revealed the fact that life can now be thought of in terms of a continuity 
of (genetic) energy: we no longer need to speak of life in general as an 
abstraction.37 He will not, however, restrict himself only to a limited form of 
this principle but speaks in general terms as a current of life that at certain 
moments and in certain portions of space has taken rise, traversing the 
bodies it organizes and passing from generation to generation. Life appears 
to have at least a twofold sense in Bergson, denoting (i) a current of creative 
energy that is precipitated into matter and wrests from it what it can; (ii) the 
durational phenomena of organic creation as outlined above. A few other 
points are worth noting about Bergson on life. First, although he refers to life 
as an energy that has entered into the habits of inert matter, he 
acknowledges that with respect to the phenomena of the simplest forms of 
life it is difficult to declare them to be solely physical and chemical since 
they may contain vital features. Second, although he maintains that at the 
root of life we find an effort to “engraft on to the necessity of physical forces 
the largest possible amount of indetermination,” this does mean that this 
effort of life results in some free creation of energy.38 Bergson unreservedly 
accepts that this kind of creation is not possible. For him the force or energy 
of life is a limited one.  
Is Bergson, then, a straightforward vitalist, that is, a thinker who 
appeals to a special principle of life and a mysterious one at that? The matter 
is complicated by several things: (i) he does not completely deny mechanism 
and speaks of a “mechanism of the whole”;39 and (ii) he does not wish to 
contest the identity between inert matter and organized matter.40 Bergson 
explicitly broaches the issue of vitalism about halfway into his first chapter, 
addressing the stumbling block of vitalistic theories.41 He does not 
uncritically embrace a vital principle but says only that although such a 
principle may not explain much it serves as a label fixed to our ignorance, 
one that mechanism invites us to ignore. Bergson has an important reason 
for being hesitant with vitalistic claims; chiefly, in nature “there is neither 
purely internal finality nor absolutely distinct individuality.”42 In short, 
where would we locate the vital principle? It cannot be in the individual 
since this is not sufficiently independent or cut off from other things, and 
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finality cannot be restricted to the individuality of the living being: “If there 
is finality in the world of life, it includes the whole of life in a single, 
indivisible embrace.”43 The problem in thinking through the nature of life 
and its special character becomes acute once we recognize that both 
mechanism and finalism are only external views of our conduct and reflect 
human modes of thinking. Bergson states his own position as follows, and it 
reveals his commitment to genuine freedom in evolution, both of the 
individual and of life itself: “This does not mean that free action is 
capricious. […] To behave according to caprice is to oscillate mechanically 
between two or more ready-made alternatives and at length to settle on one 
of them; it is no real maturity of an internal state, no real 
evolution.”44Bergson thinks “we are all born Platonists.”45 By this he means 
the human need to fit reality into the ready-made garments of our ready-
made concepts: “The idea that for a new object we might have to create a 
new concept, perhaps a new method of thinking, is deeply repugnant to 
us.”46 As in his introduction he now appeals to an expansion of our 
intellectual habits and forms of thought and so as to develop an idea of the 
whole of life: “Such is the philosophy of life to which we are leading up. It 
claims to transcend both mechanism and finalism.”47 Bergson, in fact, 
conceives of philosophy as an effort to dissolve into the whole. Of course, 
what is not clear at this stage in his argument is why we should endeavour 
to think in terms of the whole and for what ends. This dissolving has to be 
seen as the ultimate end of the task of thinking beyond the human condition. 
Bergson now attempts to give an indication of the key principle of his 
demonstration. He conceives of life as “the continuation of one and the same 
impetus, divided into divergent lines of evolution.”48 The development of 
life has taken place in terms of a dissociation of tendencies, ones that were 
unable to grow beyond a certain point without becoming mutually 
incompatible. Not until Chapter Three of the text does Bergson deal in a 
concerted fashion with questions of contingency. He notes at this point in 
the book that there is no reason why we cannot imagine evolution having 
taken place in the one single individual being and having only the one 
dimension. However, it is a fact that on earth evolution has taken place 
through millions of individuals and along divergent lines. He further 
maintains that something of the whole abides in each one of evolution’s 
parts, and this common element may explain the presence of identical 
organs in significantly different organisms and forms of life. In short, there is 
a common impulsion of life and this may account for the phenomenon of 
convergent evolution. 
Bergson now embarks on a long and detailed exploration of this topic, 
with an elaborate set of insights into the evolution of the eye across different 
phylogenetic lineages, and he does so in an effort to vindicate his thesis that 
mechanism is refutable and finality—in the special sense he understands it 
(in which it is not modelled on the human intellect)—can be demonstrated 
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in a certain aspect. I wish here to call attention to the following key critical 
point he makes. His criticism is directed at mechanistic biology. Bergson 
argues that this biology makes the passive adaptation of matter, which 
submits to the influence of an environment, equivalent to the active 
adaptation of an organism and that derives from this influence an advantage 
it can appropriate.49 He is not questioning the fact that some level of 
passivity is at work in adaptation, but calling attention to the fact that this 
does not explain the whole of the matter, especially in terms of the 
development of complexity (e.g. the evolution of the eye from the pigment-
spot of lower organisms to the complicated eye of the vertebrates). So, when 
we speak of the gradual formation of the eye, taking into account all that is 
connected with it, such as the formation of the various systems (nervous, 
muscular, osseous) that are continuous with the apparatus of vision in the 
case of vertebrate animals, we have to be speaking of something different 
from the direct action of light: “One implicitly attributes to organized matter 
a certain capacity sui generis, the mysterious power of building up very 
complicated machines to utilize the simple excitation that it undergoes.”50 
This is a key statement in the book and raises the question of just what 
conception of life Bergson himself is appealing to account for the 
development of complexity. The answer seems to reside in his appeal to a 
“psychological cause” or what he calls “an inner directing principle.”51 This, 
I think, is the key argument he evinces: 
The evolution of the organic world cannot be predetermined as a 
whole. We claim, on the contrary, that the spontaneity of life is 
manifested by a continual creation of new forms succeeding others. 
But this indetermination cannot be complete; it must leave a certain 
part to determination. An organ like the eye, for example, must 
have been formed by a continual changing in a definite direction. 
Indeed, we do not see how otherwise to explain the likeness of 
structure of the eye in species that have not the same history. 
Where we differ from Eimer is in his claim that combinations of 
physical and chemical causes are enough to secure the result. We 
have tried to prove, on the contrary, by the example of the eye, that 
if there is ‘orthogenesis’ here, a psychological cause intervenes.52  
By “psychological cause” Bergson is referring to an impetus of life: this 
impetus, he says, is sustained along the divergent lines evolution has taken, 
and is the fundamental cause of variations and that are responsible for the 
creation of new species. He once again engages with mechanism and 
finalism, claiming that it is necessary to think beyond both perspectives 
since they are only “standpoints to which the human mind has been led by 
considering the work of man.”53 His key criticism is that finalism is too 
anthropomorphic since it compares the labour of nature to that of a 
workman who proceeds by thinking of an assemblage of parts “with a view 
to the realization of an idea or the imitation of a model.”54 Although 
9 6  |  O n  B e r g s o n ’ s  R e f o r m a t i o n  o f  P h i l o s o p h y  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 2 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.772 
mechanism legitimately reproaches finalism on this point, it too proceeds 
with an equally questionable method: it gets rid of an end pursued or an 
ideal model, but it holds to the view that nature works like a human being 
that brings parts together. Contra mechanism Bergson maintains that: “Life 
does not proceed by the association and addition of elements, but by dissociation and 
division.”55  
Life is being spoken of in terms of an impetus, says Bergson, simply 
because “no image borrowed from the physical world can give more nearly 
the idea of it.”56 An image borrowed from psychology provides us with 
insight into life as the enfolding of a plurality of interpenetrating terms and 
tendencies. Bergson perhaps best explains why he thinks we need to have 
this notion of tendencies and conceive them psychologically in Chapter Two 
of the book. From it I cite the following so as to clarify what he means: “The 
elements of a tendency are not like objects set beside each other in space and 
mutually exclusive, but rather like psychic states, each of which, although it 
be itself to begin with, yet partakes of others, and so virtually includes in 
itself the whole personality to which it belongs.”57 A tendency can be 
conceived as the push or thrust (poussée) of an indistinct multiplicity, which 
is indistinct only when considered in retrospect, for example when the 
multitudinous views we take of its past undivided character enable us to see 
it composed of elements created by an actual development. Forms of life 
(groups and species) should be defined not by the possession of certain 
characters but by their tendency to emphasize them: “taking tendencies 
rather than states into account, we find that vegetables and animals may be 
precisely defined and distinguished, and that they correspond to two 
divergent developments of life” (e.g. the divergence shown in the method of 
alimentation).58 He specifically states that in accounting for the dissociation 
of tendencies there is no need to bring into the picture any mysterious 
force.59 Considered in terms of its contact with matter, life can be likened to 
an impetus or an impulsion that in itself, “is an immensity of potentiality 
(virtualité), a mutual encroachment of thousands and thousands of 
tendencies,” which are such only when spatialized.60 It is matter that carries 
out in actuality the division of this multiplicity, and individuation is to be 
treated as in part the work of matter and in part the result of the inclination 
of life.  
It is in Chapter Two of the text that Bergson pauses to consider the 
character of the vital impetus he is positing. He does so in the context of an 
attack on the errors and puerilities of (radical) finalism, which represents the 
whole of the living world as a construction analogous to a piece of human 
work. Such a finalism simply fails to do justice to the complexity of the 
evolution of life where there is not simply harmony but discord between 
species and forms of life, where not everything is coherent, where there are 
arrests and set-backs of evolution, and so on. The vital impetus informing 
evolution is, as Bergson sees it, a limited force and is at the mercy of 
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materiality.61 Bergson seeks to illustrate his point by inviting his reader to 
reflect on their own existence where we know that our attempts at freedom 
are dogged by automatism. This is not an accidental feature of our quest for 
freedom but an essential part of it since in the very movement by which our 
freedom is actually affirmed there is created the habits that stifle it. This 
means that freedom can only be practiced through the renewal of a constant 
effort. Bergson thinks this discordance between the dead and the living, or 
between the mechanical and the vital, or the habitual and the free, is to be 
explained in terms of what he calls “an irremediable difference of rhythm.”62 
Bergson expresses himself poetically to clarify this difference, writing of the 
living turning upon themselves like eddies of dust raised by the passing 
wind. Although we need to grant a stability to living organisms we also 
need to conceive of them as counterfeiting immobility, so leading us to treat 
them as things rather than systems implicated in a process. It is when we 
envisage the evolution of life as a whole that we are able to see the difference 
at work: this is the difference between life in general and the relatively stable 
but transient forms in which it is manifested. Indeed, Bergson thinks that, 
“the living being is above all a thoroughfare, and that the essence of life is in 
the movement by which life is transmitted.”63 However, although life can 
legitimately be regarded as a continually growing action, we have to 
acknowledge that actual evolution shows species existing in self-absorption, 
in which they fall into a partial sleep and ignore the rest of life.  
 
Bergson and the Hard Problem of Science: What is Life?  
For Bergson matter and life are different tendencies of reality, although it is 
clear that we are not to think of life without its relation to materiality. 
Philosophy for Bergson must attend to both matter and life. Bergson’s 
achievement is to have given us a conception of the evolution of life in terms 
of its extraordinary intricacy and complexity. He has developed new modes 
of thinking needed for the effort to conceive of nature in the wake of modern 
theories on the evolution of life. Although he conducts an ambitious 
enterprise in Creative Evolution he is always careful to qualify his remarks, to 
provide elaborate demonstrations, and to arrive at precision wherever it is 
possible. Bergson’s challenge to the doctrine of static materialism is clear 
and there are contemporary theoretical biologists who share his principal 
view, namely, that life is something sui generis.64  
Although Bergson engages with the entire history of materialism in 
his writings, his thinking on evolution is largely directed at what he sees as 
the intellectual currents prevailing in his own time, namely, the dogmatic 
materialism that deprives living beings of initiative and that imposes on 
reality a universal mechanism. Bergson never doubts that there is 
mechanism in the universe and readily acknowledges that it serves to 
capture certain features of reality. Not everything in reality is unforeseeable, 
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incalculable, spontaneous and free! His critical point is that mechanism fails 
to account for all aspects of reality, and one way he thinks we can 
demonstrate this is by marking a distinction between matter and life, with 
the former being defined as “inertia, geometry, necessity,” and the latter as 
freedom, choice, and unpredictable movement.65 All living beings are the 
subject of both matter and life; we are not to think of the two independently 
or as separate from one another. Both (matter and life) have to be 
understood as tendencies and they are implicated in one another. The 
evolution of life on earth cannot be understood without paying close 
attention to this implication. Bergson rejects the idea of a Life Force at work 
in evolution precisely because it fails to pay attention to the empirical details 
of evolution (this differs from the élan vital in that it works as a transcendent 
principle, not one that is immanent to an evolutionary movement). The 
challenge for him, then, is to attempt to think of evolution in terms of an 
initial common impulsion that has led to the divergent forms of life we 
observe and to attempt to think evolution in a way that avoids the pitfalls of 
both mechanism and finalism in their anthropomorphic forms. Although 
one may have serious doubts about the appeal to a vital impetus to account 
for the evolution of life, I think we have to acknowledge that it is at least a 
philosophically serious attempt on Bergson’s part to explain life. For him it 
names a problem and the name given to denote this problem is not the 
important thing: either we say there is a genuine problem here for 
philosophy to think about or we declare the problem to be a spurious one.  
The appeal to a vital impetus may not, however, constitute the most 
relevant aspect of Bergson’s contribution to the philosophies of nature and 
life. Although he no doubt exaggerates the geometrical and spatial habits of 
the intellect as inherent ones (as Whitehead held), his critique does raise an 
important issue for any philosophy of nature, namely, that we cannot 
uncritically accept the modes of thought and habits of representation we 
find at our disposal. Some genetic account of these modes and habits is 
required, especially if one wishes to advance a philosophy life that makes 
the effort to think life beyond the human condition. Is Bergson sufficiently 
attentive, though, to the ways in which Darwinism challenges our dominant 
modes of thought? On the one hand, I think he is and he is inspired by it. He 
takes seriously its critique of radical finalism and incorporates the key 
lessons into his own thinking about evolution, including the insight that 
there is no idea or plan of evolution. On the other hand, he is insistent that 
Darwinism does not attend to some fundamental aspects of our appreciation 
of nature, such as the need to account for the evolution of life. I have sought 
to show that Bergson cannot straightforwardly be labelled a vitalist. 
Moreover, although the notion of a vital impetus may be a problematic one, 
and one that science is right to eschew, this should not be at the expense of 
disregarding the importance of Bergson’s insights into duration and his 
attempt to get us to reflect on the sense of life in terms of a fundamental 
sympathy with it. This is not at all to fall prey to anthropomorphism but 
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precisely the opposite: it is an effort to think beyond the human condition. 
Bergson thinks this is the function of philosophy, in which the task is not to 
complete science and add to it more generalities and of some alleged higher 
order; rather, the task is to extend our perception of the universe so as to 
attempt to get closer to life. However, although Bergson thinks this task is 
peculiar to philosophy and of no interest to the scientist, we might suggest 
that contemporary science, especially in the form of complexity thinking, is 
also committed to this endeavour.  
Bergson’s decision to focus on biology as the science of living beings, 
and his attempt to raise the question of life, is, when seen the light of the 
fundamental intellectual prejudices of modern science, a bold enterprise. As 
Robert Rosen points out in his seminal study, Life Itself, physics, as we 
largely know it today, is the science of mechanism. Theoretical physics, he 
contends, has beguiled itself with a quest for what is universal and general. 
Moreover, because the physicist perceives that most things that make up the 
universe are not organisms, and not alive in any conventional sense, it is 
held that organisms are negligible and to be ignored in the quest for 
universality.66 On the one hand, it is held that biology can add nothing new 
to physics and, on the other hand, that living beings can be entirely 
understood as specializations of physical universals; all that remains is to 
specify “the innumerable constraints and boundary conditions that make 
organisms special.”67 The implication of the belief in the unlimited 
uniformity of mechanical behaviour, as well as universality of mechanical 
laws, is that all forces or energies can be studied in the same manner, with 
the added implication that all of inanimate nature could be studied through 
simple laboratory situations and with such humble laboratories serving as 
“proxies for the entire universe.”68 If biology uncritically adopts this 
mechanism as its model—for example, by approaching the organism as a 
machine—it radically simplifies and, more than, this “we literally kill life.”69 
For Rosen, adopting the mechanistic approach means losing the entailment 
we need to understand the organism; in the case of organisms “almost 
everything about is entailed by something else about them.”70 The 
presupposition of mechanism proves devastating here since it confines us to 
fragments, “pieces that individually can be regarded as mechanisms all right 
but that cannot be articulated or combined within those confines.”71 
Although Rosen is not a vitalist—he rejects both vitalism and 
evolutionism—he echoes something of Bergson’s concerns about dogmatic 
materialism when he argues that, “Life is material, but the laws framed to 
describe the properties of matter give no purchase on life.”72 Physics denies 
that there is a difference between organic systems and material systems, and 
any perceived conjunction today between physics and biology, “so fervently 
embraced by biology in the name of unification,” is blind to the manner in 
which it is caught up “in a philosophy of naïve reductionism.”73 It is on 
account of his attention to the complexity of life and natural phenomena that 
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Bergson now has an appeal to several contemporary theoretical biologists 
working at the cutting-edge of research in biology today, including the likes 
of Brian Goodwin and Mae-Wan Ho.74 
 
Conclusion 
Creative Evolution has yet to receive the attention it deserves in the 
intellectual community. More than any other work in the philosophy of life, 
this text is predominantly understood in light of what came after it. This is 
not to say merely that we interpret it in retrospect, but that the philosophical 
community has had a century to acclimatize itself to the scientific world-
view that Bergson recognized at its inception. It stands as a lesson in how 
philosophy can accompany rather than follow science, and how both 
disciplines gain from this partnership. Dynamic theories of biology and 
evolution can only operate through the recognition of the temporal character 
of living systems, ecological theories can only operate through the 
recognition of sympathy between organisms, and Bergson developed both 
these approaches at a time when biological science on the whole operated by 
treating organisms as raw material. Our thinking of life today is moving 
away from control and towards participation, away from exploitation and 
towards sustainability, and only now is scientific thought embarking on the 
path that Bergson pointed out a century ago, a path that he had seen 
indicated in the evolutionary biology of the late 19th and early 20th century. 
Bergson’s ideas are not of course the only resource for this project, but they 
surely merit being placed at the center of any serious philosophical response 
to questions of life and evolution.  
In Creative Evolution Bergson champions the empirical study of 
evolution while at the same time insisting that although science and 
philosophy have the same object (life) they each approach this object in a 
radically different manner and expect different results from their encounter 
with it. The difference of method between science and metaphysics has to be 
upheld.75 They present us with two halves of the absolute; it is certainly not 
the case that for Bergson metaphysics is the superior of positive science 
which would come after it and obtain a higher knowledge of the same 
object. If we conceive the relation between the two in this way we will 
wrong both and metaphysics will inevitably be construed as a vague and 
solely hypothetical type of knowledge. In the case of philosophy, “intuition 
may bring the intellect to recognize that life does not quite go into the 
category of the many nor yet into that of the one; that neither mechanical 
causality nor finality can give a sufficient interpretation of the vital 
process.”76 It is clear that in Bergson's thinking a distinction is to be made 
between what philosophical notions can claim when they function in concert 
with science and what validity they have when they are being developed on 
their own plane. A philosophy of life provides a vision and an intuition of 
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life that may well be considered otiose by science. The possibilities of 
thinking cannot be dictated to by the requirements of science, however, 
simply because for Bergson its own praxis is an approximation of the real 
and not the whole explanation of it. In Creative Evolution, for example, 
Bergson outlines an appreciation of life in which the duty of philosophy is 
said to be one of examining the living “without any reservation as to 
practical utility,” and it is to do this by liberating itself from forms and 
habits that are strictly intellectual: “Its own special object is to speculate, that 
is to say, to see…”77 For Bergson this means that philosophy invades the 
domain of experience and it is in the absolute that we live and move and 
have our being. Philosophy, then, “busies herself with many things which 
hitherto have not concerned her. Science, theory of knowledge, and 
metaphysics find themselves on the same ground. At first there may be a 
certain confusion. All three may think they have lost something. But all three 
will profit from the meeting.”78  
Bergson, then, is taking science extremely seriously and seeks, 
ultimately a synthesis of philosophy and science. Although our knowledge 
must be incomplete, it is, once we move in the absolute, neither simply 
external nor simply relative: “It is reality itself, in the profoundest meaning 
of the word, that we reach by the combined and progressive development of 
science and of philosophy.”79 Instead of the factitious unity imposed on 
nature by the understanding from outside we are in search of an inward, 
living unity. The specific task of philosophy is to go beyond the level of 
knowledge attained by the pure understanding, which fails to comprehend 
the extent to which it itself has been cut out from reality in terms of the 
double genesis of matter and intellect. Some identical process has cut out 
matter and the intellect from a stuff or real that contains both, and it is into 
this reality that we seek dissolve into and get back to more and more 
completely, and “in proportion as we compel ourselves to transcend pure 
intelligence.”80 In terms of some actual experience what we plunge back into 
is duration: the ethical or existential task—since Bergson’s philosophy of life 
has this aspect to it—is to come into our self-possession and highest possible 
freedom, reaching and accessing “a duration in which the past, always 
moving on, is swelling unceasingly with a present that is absolutely new.”81 
To reform philosophy is, ultimately, to get us to a point where we are able to 
intuit duration and so move closer to the realities of (our) creative evolution.  
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